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Introduction
Incorporating eco-sustainability criteria into the
corporate agenda means assigning the natural
environment such attributes as power, legitimacy,
urgency and proximity [10]. The complexity and
interconnectedness of global ecosystems make
it difficult for managers to determine specific
impacts on these systems; but that is only 
an excuse for trivial sustainability reporting and
dubious triple-bottom-line assessments. And it
is the very relationship between accountability
in the form of disclosure and ‘shareholder value’
that has kept the business-case controversy
alive [15].
There is also a second thing of vital
importance, which we dare say has never been
empirically tested: the effect of managerial
discretion on environmental performance.
Since legitimacy is now universally considered
a vital resource for the organization [8], it is
natural to hypothesize that in the long run those
who do not use the power in a responsible
manner will tend to lose it. Donna Wood [36]
proposes a hierarchical view of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) principles, with legitimacy
being the root principle, public responsibility the
second principle, and managerial discretion the
last. Thus, in her formulation, reactive firms are
motivated only by legitimacy, responsive firms
by legitimacy and public responsibility – i.e. the
outcomes related to their primary areas of
involvement with society – and interactive firms
by all three principles. However, on environmental
matters these layers of responsibility tend to
blend together, hence rendering empirical
investigation a daunting task.
If we think in terms of reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions, it is a mystery what
amount is owed to simple compliance with state
regulation, and what proportion is exclusively
an outcome of the managers’ decisions as moral
actors [5]. Moreover, some authors completely
disregard the possibility of discovering anything
other than the profound reluctance of business
leaders to be held even remotely accountable
for their actions [26]. Hence it can be hypothe-
sized that environment-centered, rather than
business-centered, enterprises are still rare birds.
The present contribution seeks to capture
the relationship between greenhouse gas
emissions and company financial performance.
The data were extracted from corporate annual
and sustainability reports of Europe’s largest
industrial groups over a period between 2004
and 2007. The study’s hypotheses are collated
from a literature review spanning almost
a quarter of a century, and panel data analysis
is conducted using a variety of econometric
methods and model specifications. The results
are mixed, with pollution levels in some cases
decreasing with better financial performance,
while in others being positively related to
profitability. The results are not robust across
industries, and to several model misspecifica-
tions. Owing to the uniqueness of the database
in use and to the complexity of the econometric
analysis, our findings are another proof of the
controversy surrounding the relationship
between firm financial and environmental
performance.
1. A literature Review: The
Environmental Performance /
Financial Performance
Relationship
Correlational analysis has produced some
interesting results, even if we believe that the
statistical issues associated with inflated Type
I errors and assumption testing have not been
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properly addressed. Pava & Krausz [27]
suggested that there is almost no evidence that
socially responsible firms perform worse than
other firms; in fact, most of the evidence
pointed to a stronger financial performance of
responsible firms, but also to a disproportion in
size compared to the control group. Preston &
O'Bannon [28] computed 270 correlations in
both contemporaneous and lead-lag form for
a date set covering an 11-year time period; they
found support for the hypothesis that there is
a positive association between social and
financial performance in large US firms,
especially for the case of financial performance
influencing social responsiveness. On the
same note, Waddock & Graves [33] evaluated
the linkage between financial and social
performance, using CSR as both a dependent
and independent variable; they found that
social responsibility positively depends on
financial performance, but, at the same time,
good financial ratios are correlated with lagged
social performance, possibly forming a virtuous
circle. Griffin & Mahon [16] corroborate these
results by arguing that they found no firms in
the high corporate social performance and low
financial performance group.
A large number of studies have envisaged
corporate environmental (and social) performance
as an explanatory variable for such outcomes
as stock valuation and market risk. In this
respect, Konar & Cohen [19] found that poor
environmental performance has a significant
negative effect on the intangible-asset value of
publicly traded firms, while the effect of toxic
emission levels tends to be both statistically
and economically significant. The above
evidence is supported also by Freedman &
Patten [12] who suggest that companies with
worse pollution performance suffered more
negative market reactions than firms with lower
emissions; on the other hand, voluntary
environmental disclosure appears to mitigate
the negative impact of actual performance
information, which is consistent with the findings
of Murray et al. [23]. Finally, the evidence
brought by Ziegler et al. [38] is somewhat
neutral: the stock market rewards investment in
clean sectors with a premium, while the
environmental and social behavior of managers
does not diminish the stock performance of the
corporation. However, it should be noted that
their results indicate that a stronger sustainable
behavior does not have a positive effect either,
such that no explicit incentives for socially
desirable activities can be clearly identified.
The studies using accounting measures of
profitability on the dependent variables’ side
can be separated into two groups: the former
dealing with the broader issue of social
performance, and the latter using the more
restrictive indicators of environmental performance
as explanatory variables. The inquiry of Lopez
et al. [20] shows that the effect of CSR
practices was negative in the short-term, but
positive effects on profitability were noticed
several years after the inclusion of a company
in a sustainability index. Perhaps unexpectedly,
a composite measure of corporate social
performance (CSP) may exhibit no relationship
with traditional accounting measures of
profitability, but component dimensions, like the
environmental performance, actually might
[21]. And it is quite common for researchers
nowadays to proceed to itemize each CSR
aspect, i.e. the environment, consumers,
human rights, in order to gain more control over
the analytic process.
Among all CSR dimensions, environmental
performance has always been a focal point of
research, partly because sustainability is
becoming more and more of a newspaper
headline, and partly because pollution levels
and ratings are more easily quantifiable and
comparable than other social performance
measures. When profitability is measured with
regard to return-on-assets (ROA), Russo &
Fouts [29] suggest that “it pays to be green”,
and that this relationship strengthens as
industry growth increases. Conversely, Balabanis
et al. [2] found that environmental protection,
while carrying a higher cost for the firm, is also
a low profitability driver for subsequent periods.
This result is consistent with the reported
findings of Wagner et al. [34], which resonate
with the traditionalists’ predictions [14] on the
uniformly negative relationship between
environmental performance and economic
performance. Supporting evidence seems to
pile up, according to Telle [31] who produces
evidence that the previously-reported positive
effect of plant-level environmental performance
on accounting performance (return on sales)
tends to dissolve when unobserved plant
characteristics are accounted for using
a random effects model for panel data. Finally,
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Van der Laan et al. [32] actually say that,
apparently, a good reputation for being concerned
with the environment leads to real monetary
losses. Consequently, it seems that attaining
a positive reputation requires investments up to
a point where marginal returns may eventually
outweigh marginal costs, thus rendering the
conclusion that “it pays to be green” premature. 
The relationship between environmental
(and social) performance and accounting
figures is still controversial, but researchers
have come to agree that the legitimizing nature
of environmental disclosures is boldly expressed
whenever sustainability efforts are presented in
monetary terms [7]. Beyond mere disclosure
there lies a whole world of uncertainty, and
researchers have had to deal with it ever since
the first inquiries into the problematic
relationship between corporate sustainability
and firm economics. 
2. Sample Selection and Variable
Description
2.1 The Identification and
Measurement Issue
Applied researchers are sometimes forced to
ignore the theoretical consequences of introducing
a new concept (e.g. environmental performance);
more often, they will be tempted to adopt a less
rigorous, but more down-to-earth exploratory
effort of pinning down all visible implications.
Therefore, the most important design and
methodology issue related to environmental
(and social) performance is the real-life
identification of the actual construct [17]. 
For the purpose of this paper, the issue of
performance indicator (or content) validity was
paramount. That is why we hand-collected raw
emissions data from the corporate annual
reports of the largest European industrial groups.
These data, expressed in uniform units of
measurement, are used without subsequent
rankings or classifications, in order to be able to
draw valid conclusions on the relationship between
emission levels and financial performance. We
caution the reader not to immediately extrapolate
pollution levels to the more comprehensive
concept of environmental performance; in our
view, the very careful determination of our
performance indicator is a major strength, but
also a limitation of this particular research
design.
In their sustainability reports, large business
groups generally disclose consolidated amounts
of greenhouse gas emissions for all their
subsidiaries and range of activities. Data are
self-reported by all facilities within the
consolidation perimeter, based on estimates or
on actual measurements, depending on the
production process, and refer exclusively to the
carbon footprint of the facility, and not that of
the products themselves. Thus we may question
the reliability of the disclosed figures, just as we
sometimes doubt “the true and fair view”
generated by the accounting department.
Nevertheless, the European Union policy has
been designed to address greenhouse gas
emission measurement and reporting issues,
as well as allowance trading.
Since the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change entered into force on 
21 March 1994, the European Union launched
a debate on the suitability and possible functioning
of greenhouse gas emissions trading within the
EU borders. The Kyoto Protocol and its binding
targets for 37 industrialized countries and the
European community for reducing greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions, was implemented in
conjunction with the Sixth Community Environ-
ment Action Programme which provided for the
establishment of a Community-wide emissions
trading scheme by 2005. The regulatory output
– mainly Directive 2003/87/EC establishing
a scheme for greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading – was especially designed to
ensure sound reporting and robust verification
for the activities of the operators which fall
under the national allocation plan. However, of
greatest interest to our research is the discussion
of how companies can fulfill a complete,
consistent, transparent and accurate monitoring
and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions, in
accordance with the guidelines laid down in the
Decision 2004/156/EC, as amended by
Decision 2007/589/EC5.
In the aforementioned Decision, the European
Commission puts forward six monitoring and
reporting principles: completeness, consistency,
transparency, trueness, cost effectiveness, and
faithfulness, which resemble the International
Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) Conceptual
Framework, or the Global Reporting Initiative’s
(GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. Next,
it describes the calculation and measurement-
based methodologies for the determination of
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emissions, alongside a detailed monitoring plan
to be prepared by the operator (company or plant
management), and checked and approved by
the competent authority. Specific CO2 emissions
calculation formulae are also provided for
combustion emissions (based on fuel consumption)
and process emissions (based on material
consumption). Finally, control and verification
procedures require that the operators shall
establish, document, implement and maintain
effective data acquisition and handling activities
for the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse
gas emissions. Overall, the European Commission
has created the regulatory framework for the
provision of reliable data, produced by certified
measurement systems employing transparent
methodologies.
This brief overview of relevant Community
regulation was intended to convince the reader
that, even if the data are collected from corporate
sustainability reports, we can be reasonably
assured that the calculation of emissions is at
least free from material misstatements. Moreover,
all the companies in our sample have established
EN/ISO 14001 environmental management
systems aimed at achieving the organization’s
environmental policy defined by the top
management. Consequently, we strongly
believe that the collected data, although not
perfectly free from bias or non-conformities, are
the best available at the moment in terms of
relevance and reliability.
2.2 Sample Description
Our balanced panel data consist of 77 European
business groups, for which the performance
indicators were extracted over a four-year
period, between 2004 and 2007, with a total of
308 observations. The parent company of each
group is listed on a European market, and
included in the Dow Jones STOXX sector
indices available for Europe. We used the index
component lists as of the end of August 2008,
for the following classifications according to the
companies’ primary source of revenue (sector
codes are between brackets): Industrials (2000),
Basic Materials (1000), Oil & Gas (0500) and
Healthcare (4500). These sectors are environ-
mentally sensitive; we expected therefore a higher
level of environmental performance disclosure
from their constituents. Table 1 contains a list of
all sample companies and the country of
incorporation for the parent of the group.
The dependent variable (GGE) is an environ-
mental performance measure, namely consolidated
greenhouse gas emissions for a whole financial
year. It is expressed in kilotons of CO2
equivalent, and it was extracted from annual
corporate sustainability reports beginning with
2004. The application of this selection criterion
revealed profound differences in the quality of
environmental disclosure among higher
polluting sectors (see Table 2): companies
activating in the production of Basic Materials
exhibit higher levels of sustainability disclosure
compared to the Oil & Gas and Healthcare
sectors. However, maybe not surprisingly, Oil &
Gas producers are as large a polluter as cement
or steel industry members. These discrepancies
are food for thought, as the literature has not
documented until now the Europe-wide propen-
sity for corporate environmental disclosure, in
the context of sector analysis. The sample is
representative, firstly because it tracks the
largest by market capitalization of the European
quoted business groups, and secondly
because it encompasses companies from 16
Western and Central European countries, of
which U.K. companies occupy more than
a quarter of the sample (25.9 %), followed by
France (12 %) and Switzerland (11 %).
Another element of novelty is represented
by the configuration of a binary variable
capturing the quality of sustainability governance.
All listed companies are required to compile
a corporate governance statement for the
reporting year, but some do disclose more on
their practices related to sustainability. Our
binary variable is an interaction term between
the presence of a particular governance
structure, and the level of assurance of any
company’s annual sustainability report. Firstly
we collected data on the presence of such
board-level or managerial structures dealing
with environmental protection, or more
generally with sustainable development issues;
63 of a total of 77 companies have some kind
of responsibility governance structure in place
(e.g. the Sustainable Development Committee,
or the Director of Sustainable Affairs). Secondly,
we checked whether each company’s latest
sustainability report had been subject to inde-
pendent assurance [1], [9], [24]. We considered
a report to have received assurance only if the
auditors’ opinion made clear comments on the
environmental data, not just on the presentation
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Tab. 1: 
A List of the Companies Included in the Analyzed Sample, their Country 
of Incorporation and CSR Score (i.e. the responsible governance binary variable)
Company Country CSR Company Country CSR
ABB CH 1 K + S DE 0
Abertis ES 1 Lafarge FR 1
Acciona ES 1 LONMIN GB 1
ACS ES 1 Metso FI 0
Aéroports de Paris FR 0 MONDI GB 1
Air Liquide FR 1 Norsk Hydro NO 1
AMEC GB 0 Novartis CH 1
Anglo American GB 1 Novo Nordisk DK 0
Arkema FR 0 Novozymes DK 0
AstraZeneca GB 1 OMV AT 1
Atlas Copco SE 0 Outokumpu FI 1
BAE Systems GB 0 Premier Oil GB 0
Balfour Beatty GB 1 Repsol YPF ES 1
BASF DE 0 Rhodia FR 1
Bayer DE 1 Rio Tinto GB 1
BG Group GB 1 Roche CH 1
BHP Billiton GB 1 Royal Dutch Shell GB 0
BP GB 1 Ruukki FI 0
Brisa PT 1 Saint-Gobain FR 0
Cairn Energy GB 1 Sanofi-Aventis FR 1
Ciba CH 0 Scania SE 0
CIMPOR PT 0 SKF SE 1
Clariant CH 0 Smith & Nephew GB 0
Cobham GB 0 Smiths Group GB 0
CRH IE 1 Solvay BE 0
DSM NL 1 StatoilHydro NO 0
ENI IT 1 Stora Enso FI 1
Eramet FR 0 Syngenta CH 1
Gamesa ES 1 Titan Cement GR 1
Georg Fischer CH 1 TNT NL 1
Givaudan CH 0 Travis Perkins GB 0
GlaxoSmithKline GB 1 Umicore BE 0
Grifols ES 0 UPM Kymmene FI 0
HeidelbergCement DE 0 Vallourec FR 1
Holcim CH 0 Volvo SE 0
Holmen SE 1 Wärtsilä FI 0
Imerys FR 1 Xstrata GB 1
Italcementi IT 1 Yara NO 0
Johnson Matthey GB 0
Source: own
Note. The CSR score is the interaction between the presence of a governance structure dealing specifically with
sustainability and the opinion of the independent auditor concerning the reliability of the data in the environmental
reports.
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Tab. 2: Sample Constituents per Sector
Sector Index Sample Percentage Percentage
constituents firms per of selected of final 
per sector sector companies sample
per sector
Industrials 120 23 19.16 29.80
Basic Materials 47 36 76.59 46.76
Oil & Gas 40 9 22.50 11.68
Healthcare 33 9 27.27 11.68
Total 240 77 - 100 %
(final sample)
Source: own
Tab. 3: Financial Accounting Indicators, Grouped into Several Classes (Part 1)
Class Ratio Formula
1. Asset utilization Asset age (AA): indicates the extent to which Carrying value of PPE / 
measurements a company has continued to replace its Original cost of PPE
existing assets with new ones on an ongoing 
basis. A high value indicates a high proportion 
of modernized property, plant and equipment 
(PPE).
Investment turnover ratio (ITR): signals the Sales / 
ability of a company to convert its debt and (Shareholders’ equity + 
equity into sales. A high ratio indicates a high Long-term liabilities)
level of efficiency in creating sales.
Sales per person ratio (SPP): high degrees Annualized revenue / 
of employee efficiency are bound to result in Full-time equivalents
strong profitability. 
2. Operating Operating income to sales ratio (OIS): reveals Operating income /
performance the return from standard operations, excluding Revenue
measurements the impact of extraordinary and discontinued 
operations. 
Net income to operating income ratio (NOI): Net income from 
quantifies the effect of financing and other continuing operations /
elements on the reported operating income. Operating income
3. Cash flow Cash flow from operations (CFO): can be Cash flow from operating 
measurements used to determine the extent to which cash activities /
flow differs from the reported level Operating income
of operating income.
Cash flow return on assets (CFR): is used to Cash flow from operating 
calculate the amount of cash that a company activities /
is generating in proportion to its asset level. Total assets
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Tab. 3: Financial Accounting Indicators, Grouped into Several Classes (Part 2)
Class Ratio Formula
4. Liquidity Current ratio (CR): is used by lenders to Current assets / 
measurements determine whether a company has sufficient Current liabilities
liquidities to pay its debt.
Cash ratio (CSH): uses only cash and Cash and short term 
short-term marketable securities in the investments / 
numerator, so it is the best way to see what Current liabilities
proportion of liabilities can be paid immediately.
Short-term to long-term debt (SLD): reveals Total short-term debt /
the proportion of total debt that is coming due Total debt
for payment in the near term.
5. Capital structure Debt to equity ratio (DTE): reveals the extent Total debt / 
measurements to which company management is willing to Equity
fund its operations with debt, rather than equity.
Funded capital ratio (FCR): shows the (Stockholders’ equity + 
proportion of fixed assets that are being Long-term debt) / 
funded by long-term funding, which is defined Non-current assets
as long-term debt and stockholders’ equity. 
6. Return on investment Return on assets employed (ROAE): Net profit / 
measurements is considered critical for determining Total assets
a company’s overall level of operating efficiency. 
We use net income from continuing operations.
Operating return on equity (ROE): is used by Operating income /
investors to determine the amount of return Equity
they are receiving from their capital investment 
in a company.
Earnings per share (EPS): is the standard Net income / 
used to compare the financial results Number of shares 
of publicly held companies. outstanding
Source: own
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of the report or on the implementation of
environmental management systems. Consequently,
the interaction between the presence of
sustainability governance structures and the
presence of independent assurance resulted in
an objective and original dichotomy coded CSR,
awarding one point for socially responsible
governance, found in 42 companies, and none
for the remaining 35 firms (see Tab. 1 for the
distribution of the binary score for the entire
sample).
Company size is the most common control
variable to be found in the literature [25]. In our
study, it is operationalized through two indicators:
consolidated total assets (TA), expressed in
millions and converted to the Euro at year-end
exchange rates; and number of full-time equivalent
employees (EMP) at the end of the fiscal year,
as disclosed within the annual reports. It is
expected that these two measures of company
size in absolute terms to be highly correlated
with pollution levels, in order to explain static
inter-firm differences.
Another measure bound to capture the variation
between companies is a five-year average of
the industry return on assets (IROA), as
suggested by Russo & Fouts [29]. Following
the guidelines offered by Reuters.com, we
classified our four-sector companies into 28
industries, for which IROA was already present
on the mentioned website. One disadvantage
of this indicator is that it aggregates asset
returns for companies on five continents, thus
diminishing its relevance for the European
territory.
To test the relationship between environmental
performance and financial performance, we
collected data for fifteen accounting performan-
ce measures (see Table 3 for a detailed
presentation). We believe that this is to date the
most comprehensive financial performance
database in use for this type of study [16],
mainly because we encompassed a range of
performance measurement spanning six broad
classes [6]. It is worth noting that companies’
adoption of the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) led to comparable
data for 2004, for which listed European firms
were required to issue ‘in compliance’ financial
statements; thus, accounting data before 2004
was not suitable for our study, due to lack of
comparability.
3. Hypotheses, Methodology 
and Results
3.1 Sustainability Governance and
Firm Performance
The literature has not documented until now the
effect of sustainability governance on actual
pollution levels. We use our dichotomous
variable CSR to capture board involvement in
sustainability issues, but only as far as a binary
variable can go. Therefore, we do not expect
high sensitivity to environmental and social
challenges, but rather a bird’s-eye view on the
two groups that exhibit CSR involvement or
CSR indifference. We will formulate our first
two hypotheses as follows:
Ha1: Companies involved in CSR activities
at board level will be smaller polluters than
CSR indifferent firms.
Ha2: Sustainability governance has an impact
on the enterprises’ financial performance
levels.
The results are displayed in Table 4. Naturally,
we use classical parametric t-tests to assess
the differences between the two groups.
However, we do not rely fully on these tests, as
several assumptions must be validated. Firstly,
Levene’s test indicates that the homogeneity of
variance assumption is generally not violated,
with the exception of three financial performance
measures (OIS, SLD, and EPS). Even so, the
parametric t-test includes Welch’s correction for
unequal variances, as a measure of precaution.
Secondly, the normality assumption is violated
for almost every variable. We use Shapiro-
Wilk’s statistic to test the null hypothesis that
the two groups are extracted from normally
distributed populations in the context of each
performance measure. We strongly reject that
null hypothesis, and consequently use
nonparametric tests of differences between two
independent means (Mann-Whitney) for our
hypotheses.
Total assets (TA) and number of employees
(EMP) are significantly larger for CSR involved
companies; also, it appears that CSR involvement
leads to a lower capacity to convert corporate
debt and equity into sales (ITR). On the other
hand, sustainability governance appears to
discriminate between corporate profitability
levels, as operating income to sales (OIS) and
earnings per share (EPS) are significantly
higher for those companies which adopt
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independently audited CSR policies. It must be
noted that the statistical effects for the financial
performance indicators remain within the
‘small’ interval. In that sense, parametric and
nonparametric tests are consistent mainly
because they all report statistical results of
lesser practical importance, and thus not very
conclusive.
However, the nonparametric tests capture
two more points of divergence between our two
groups. Firstly, CSR indifferent companies appear
to have a higher proportion of fixed assets
funded from long-term capital (FCR), but to
a very small effect. And secondly, CSR involved
enterprises are bigger polluters (GGE), thus
rejecting hypothesis Ha1, but to a small
statistical effect. The parametric t-test does not
capture this difference in means, which may be
due to the extremely high positive skewness of
pollution levels for our sample.
All in all, if we take the effect size as
a definitive criterion, we can say little about the
differences to be found between the two
groups. The small to medium effect concerning
asset age (AA) may be due to the particularities
of each sector, but the sample size does not
permit us to investigate any further. Conversely,
the higher levels of investment turnover (ITR)
found to belong to CSR indifferent firms are not
implicitly connected to bottom line profitability.
But most importantly, sustainability governance
appears to fail the challenge of increased
pollution; alternatively, CSR policies may not be
destined to address environmental issues, but
to repair legitimacy through disclosure. Statistics
will never provide a definitive answer to this
dilemma, hence legitimacy will remain unobservable.
3.2 Regression Analysis: Results
and Discussion
The panel structure gives us the unique
opportunity of having “more informative data,
more variability, less collinearity among
variables, more degrees of freedom and more
efficiency” [3]. Our formulation of an alternative
hypothesis for regression analysis is:
Ha3: Greenhouse gas emission levels are
significantly related to contemporaneous financial
performance, after controlling for unobserved
individual and sector characteristics.
The random-effects model is appropriate
for our panel data structure [13]. In spite of
a possible self-selection bias resulting from
size or industry attributes, we can safely
consider our sample to be randomly extracted
from the population of large European companies.
In this situation, it is natural to use subject-
specific parameters to represent the hetero-
geneity among subjects. Panel-data theorists
[37] recommend using the random-effects
model in studies where the time dimension is
small (T = 4 in our case), because fewer degrees
of freedom are necessary to account for the
subject-specific parameters. This specification
also has the advantage of accommodating group
fixed effects, like industry or CSR dummies.
Thus, the estimation of the random-effects
model assumes that the dependent variable is
a normally distributed independent random
variable, conditional on the error components.
Since the distribution of the untransformed
GGE was positively skewed (skewness = 2.64,
kurtosis = 9.50), we use the logarithmic
transformation on GGE, which imposes to change
the interpretation of regression coefficients from
absolute to relative changes in the dependent
variable. Visually inspecting the distribution of
Log of GGE suggests normality, but the more
formal Shapiro-Wilk test rejects the null
hypothesis (W = 0.97, p < .001); however, we
must remember that tests such as the above
tend to declare non-normality based on very
small deviations in large samples [11].
Correlation analysis is a preliminary step in
discussing the implications of multicollinearity
in regression analysis. Table 5 displays the
parametric (Pearson’s r) and nonparametric
(Spearman’s ρ) matrix for the dependent and
covariate variables. We use both types of
correlation measures because we believe that
in some cases the parametric assumption of
Pearson’s test may be violated. The results are
qualitatively identical, with high correlations
(greater than .60) between the untransformed
GGE and firm size indicators, i.e. TA (total
assets) and EMP (number of employees). 
On each side of the table, only five more
significant correlations are above the .60 threshold,
notably those between ROAE and three other
variables: OIS, CFR, and EPS. Overall, it
appears that GGE is not significantly related to
any variables except the firm size proxies, while
the financial performance measures are largely
independent of each other. Since TA and EMP
are highly correlated (r = .58, ρ = .81), we will
use them alternatively in our model building. In
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order to improve the predictive ability of the
models by means of approaching normality in
the firm size proxies, we use Log of TA and Log
of EMP, which are also highly correlated with
each other (r = .78, ρ = .81).
The results of regression analysis will be
discussed in the context of several model
specifications. Table 6 shows the base model
estimation with all 15 financial performance
indicators as predictors, plus the CSR binary
variable; industry fixed effects are included in
the extended specification; finally, the addition
of company size control variables serve to
complete the model building process. The story
behind the changes in explanatory power can
be summarized as follows: the base model is
better at explaining the variation within the
entities (R2 within = .1854), but does a very
unsatisfactory job at explaining the differences
between companies (R2 between = .0747). As
expected, the industry fixed effects improve
explanatory power only for the differences
between the units (R2 between = .4059). When
taking into account the number of employees
for each firm-year observation, we manage to
better explain the variation within each company
(R2 within = .3104), and also between the sample
firms (R2 between = .6451). The alternative
specification with total assets as a proxy for
company size explains more of the variation within
the units (R2 within = .3680), but less of the diffe-
rences between companies (R2 between = .6118).
A very interesting result, which is consistent
across all specifications, is that return on equity
(ROE) is positively and significantly related to
increases in pollution levels. On the other hand,
responsible governance (CSR) appears to
make no difference in pollution control. When
including the industry fixed effects, the base
category is set to the Industrials sector, which is
not significantly different from Healthcare in
terms of greenhouse gas emissions. However,
companies belonging to the Basic Materials
and Oil & Gas industries have visible high-
polluter profiles, but emission levels seem to be
significantly lower for firms belonging to
industries with a higher 5-year average
profitability (IROA). It is somewhat puzzling to
notice that sales per person (SPP) is positively
related to emission levels when the number of
employees is used as a control variable, but
negatively related when Log of TA is used as
a proxy for firm size. Capital structure
measures (FCE and DTE) are both negatively
linked to pollution levels; in the case of debt to
equity ratio (DTE), emissions appear to
decrease for a positive change in the proportion
of debt over equity; conversely, pollution levels
are increasing for a lower proportion of fixed
assets funded through long-term capital. Finally,
satisfactory sales efficiency (ITR) and return
from operations (OIS) are linked to significant
decreases in pollution levels.
For the base model specification, the results
are not robust across industries (see Table 7).
The most important remark is that the sign of
some significant coefficients is not consistent
across models; notice the incompatibilities for
the ROE and ROAE predictors. The signs are
consistent, but the coefficient standard errors
too high for variables such as asset age (AA),
investment turnover ratio (ITR), operating
income per sales (OIS), net income to
operating income ratio (NOI) and funded capital
ratio (FCR). The evidence is overwhelmingly
though in favor of a negative relationship
between financial performance and emission
levels. Only the 23 companies belonging to the
Industrials group seem to increase their sales
per person (SPP) and earnings per share
(EPS) while also becoming bigger polluters.
Surprisingly, responsible governance (CSR) is
also related to higher pollution levels for firms
activating in the Oil & Gas sector. The
predictive ability of the four industry-tailored
models is also extremely inconsistent, with two
of them explaining almost 100 % of variation
between entities (Oil & Gas and Healthcare),
and the Industrials model explaining almost nil.
Overall, it appears that industry-specific
heterogeneity is a major obstacle in obtaining
reliable estimates of model coefficients.
We used the Huber [18] / White [35] / sandwich
estimator implemented in the Stata software
[30] to compute robust variances, in order to
give accurate assessments of the sample-to-
sample variability of the parameter estimates
even when the model is misspecified. The results
presented in Table 8, under the Heterosce-
dasticity robust models heading, are consistent
with the previous findings, in that industry
dummies, industry profitability and size proxies
are all highly significant. However, sales per
person (SPP) has an inconsistent sign when
alternate company size measures are used,
and only the operating income to sales ratio
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Tab. 6: 
Panel Data Regression Analysis in Contemporaneous Setting 
(dependent variable: natural logarithm of Greenhouse gas emissions)
Vars Base model With industry With company size control variables
with CSR fixed fixed effects
effects No. of employees Total assets
Intercept 7.013 (< .01)** 6.57 (< .001)** 0.4666 (.557) 1.8556 (.005)**
CSR dummy 0.6356 (.164) 0.4377 (.266) 0.2070 (.486) 0.1770 (.562)
BM dummy 2.71 (< .001)** 2.71 (< .001)** 2.52 (< .001)**
OG dummy 4.84 (< .001)** 4.53 (< .001)** 4.06 (< .001)**
HC dummy 1.31 (.076) 0.7242 (.196) 0.5074 (.380)
IROA -0.2748 (.003)** -0.1985 (.005)** -0.2046 (.005)**
Log of EMP 0.6254 (< .01)**
Log of TA 0.5728 (< .01)**
AA 0.0033 (.352) 0.0041 (.236) -0.0001 (.958) -00023 (.457)
ITR -0.0008 (.105) -0.0006 (.159) -0.0016 (< .01)** -0.0002 (.651)
SPP 0.2076 (.040)* 0.1600 (.109) 0.2342 (.013)* -0.2511 (.012)*
OIS -0.0007 (.444) -0.0009 (.358) -0.0015 (.092) -0.0031 (.001)**
NOI -0.0002 (.432) -0.0002 (.439) -0.0002 (.367) -0.0002 (.384)
CFO -0.0001 (.950) -0.0001 (.882) 0.0001 (.698) -0.0001 (.819)
CFR 0.0011 (.780) 0.0013 (.728) 0.0005 (.880) 0.0041 (.249)
CR -0.0015 (.021)* -0.0016 (.011)* -0.0010 (.104) 0.0001 (.844)
CSH 0.0010 (.284) 0.0011 (.234) 0.0011 (.192) 0.0007 (.368)
SLD -0.0002 (.704) -0.0003 (.650) 0.0008 (.266) 0.0004 (.535)
DTE 0.0002 (.525) 0.0002 (.353) -0.0002 (.443) -0.0007 (.011)*
FCR 0.0001 (.859) 0.0004 (.618) -0.0010 (.227) -0.0024 (.012)*
EPS 0.0026 (.643) 0.0019 (.722) 0.0014 (.782) -0.0069 (.170)
ROE 0.0046 (<.01)** 0.0047 (< .001)** 0.0047 (< .01)** 0.0049 (< .01)**
ROAE -0.0002 (.734) -0.0014 (.841) 0.0018 (.782) 0.0074 (.246)
Wald χ2 50.66** 103.87** 241.48** 249.78** 
(df = 16) (df = 20) (df = 21) (df = 21)
R2 within† .1854 .1870 .3104 .3680
R2 between†† .0746 .4059 .6451 .6118
R2 overall††† .0747 .4049 .6433 .6105
Source: own
Notes. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
We specified random-effects models using the feasible GLS estimator. 
For each model, we present the unstandardized coefficients, with their p-values between parentheses.
† R2 within indicates explained variation of emissions during the four-year period, for each company.
†† R2 between indicates explained variation between companies.
††† R2 overall is defined as the squared correlation between observed and predicted values.
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Tab. 7: 
Regression Results for the Base Model with CSR Fixed Effects, Grouped by 
Sector (dependent variable: natural logarithm of Greenhouse gas emissions)
Vars Industrials Basic materials Oil & Gas Healthcare
(23 companies) (36 companies) (9 companies) (9 companies)
Intercept 4.9924 (< .001)** 8.9755 (< .001)** 22.77 (< .001)** 24.36 (< .001)**
CSR dummy 0.2241 (.750) 0.1073 (.852) 0.8684 (.002)** 0.3259 (.680)
AA 0.0052 (.542) -0.0049 (.350) -0.1373 (< .001)** -0.0519 (.008)**
ITR -0.0006 (.460) -0.0020 (.004)** -0.0021 (.776) -0.0487 (< .01)**
SPP 2.5388 (.006)** 0.0128 (.948) 0.2553 (.429) 1.3962 (.877)
OIS -0.0013 (.931) -0.0027 (.567) -0.0490 (< .001)** -0.1649 (.021)*
NOI 0.0011 (.524) 0.0001 (.801) -0.0833 (< .001)** -0.1070 (< .01)**
CFO 0.003 (.458) 0.0001 (.682) 0.0046 (.066) 0.0010 (.832)
CFR 0.0191 (.065) -0.0038 (.404) -0.1218 (.039)* 0.0561 (.515)
CR -0.0045 (.060) -0.0001 (.901) 0.0011 (.902) -0.0020 (.857)
CSH 0.0059 (.023) -0.0001 (.931) -0.0057 (.475) 0.0070 (.572)
SLD -0.0007 (.718) -0.0005 (.675) 0.0053 (.341) -0.0089 (.346)
DTE 0.0004 (.458) -0.0012 (.025)* -0.0156 (.065) -0.0062 (.302)
FCR 0.0011 (.637) -0.0036 (.007)** -0.0215 (.336) -0.0520 (.008)**
EPS 0.0265 (.044)* -0.0025 (.637) 0.0589 (.684) 0.1825 (.512)
ROE 0.0139 (.003)** 0.0073 (< .001)** -0.0603 (< .001)** -0.0128 (.640)
ROAE -0.0706 (.014)* 0.0060 (.384) 0.5425 (< .001)** 0.5017 (.003)**
Wald χ2
(df = 16) 61.44** 99.49* 757.46** 121.89**
R2 within† .5511 .5317 .0114 .0471
R2 between†† .0000 .3556 .9948 .9526
R2 overall††† .0014 .3228 .9755 .8561
No. Obs. 92 144 36 36
Source: own
Notes. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
We specified random-effects models using the feasible GLS estimator. 
For each model, we present the unstandardized coefficients, with their p-values between parentheses.
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Tab. 8: 
Robust Regression Results for the Models with Company Size Control Variables 
(dependent variable: natural logarithm of Greenhouse gas emissions)
Vars Heteroscedasticity robust models Autocorrelated residuals models
No. of employees Total assets No. of employees Total assets
Intercept 0.4666 (.606) 1.8556 (.010)* -2.2984 (.004)** -0.8041 (.270)
CSR dummy 0.2070 (.483) 0.1770 (.555) 0.1017 (.600) 0.0482 (.808)
BM dummy 2.711 (< .001)** 2.5242 (< .01)** 2.7393 (< .01)** 2.4766 (< .01)**
OG dummy 4.535 (< .001)** 4.0617 (< .01)** 4.4282 (< .01)** 3.7637 (< .01)**
HC dummy 0.7242 (.108) 0.5074 (.316) 0.4733 (.196) 0.1116 (.768)
IROA -0.1985 (< .01)** -0.2046 (.001)** -0.1742 (< .01)** -0.1775 (< .01)**
Log of EMP 0.6254 (< .01)** 0.8813 (< .01)**
Log of TA 0.5728 (< .01)** 0.8587 (< .01)**
AA -0.0001 (.961) -0.0023 (.502) 0.0012 (.794) -0.0031 (.507)
ITR -0.0016 (.033)* -0.0002 (.743) -0.0023 (.001)** -0.0001 (.922)
SPP 0.2342 (.028)* -0.2511 (0.019)* 0.3181 (.030)* -0.4495 (.005)**
OIS -0.0015 (.083) -0.0031 (.003)** -0.0024 (.081) -0.0051 (< .001)**
NOI -0.0002 (.693) -0.0002 (.705) -0.0001 (.767) -0.0001 (.780)
CFO 0.0001 (.473) 0.0001 (.716) 0.0001 (.823) -0.0001 (.932)
CFR 0.0001 (.909) 0.0041 (.419) 0.0023 (.681) 0.0075 (.189)
CR -0.0010 (.096) 0.0012 (.850) -0.0006 (.514) 0.0012 (.201)
CSH 0.0011 (.169) 0.0007 (.391) 0.0006 (.642) -0.0001 (.926)
SLD 0.0008 (.279) 0.0004 (.593) 0.0014 (.177) 0.0010 (.358)
DTE -0.0002 (.650) -0.0007 (.112) 0.0002 (.669) -0.0005 (.278)
FCR -0.0010 (.296) -0.0024 (.033)* -0.0011 (.437) -0.0032 (.028)*
EPS 0.0014 (.787) -0.0069 (.270) -0.0036 (.642) -0.0152 (.057)
ROE 0.0047 (.078) 0.0049 (.068) 0.0045 (.008)** 0.0051 (.003)**
ROAE 0.0018 (.813) 0.0074 (.365) 0.0095 (.338) 0.0214 (.035)*
Wald χ2
(df = 22) 4064.20** 3632.87** 437.42** 414.14**
R2 within† .3104 .3680 .2813 .3332
R2 between†† .6451 .6118 .6929 .6722
R2 overall††† .6433 .6105 .6901 .6694
rhoAR(1) .3088 .3215
Source: own
Notes. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
We specified random-effects models using the GLS estimator. 
For each model, we present the unstandardized coefficients, with their p-values between parentheses.
rhoAR(1) is the estimated first-order autocorrelation coefficient, which is significantly different from 0; F(1,76) = 22.07
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(OIS) seems to be negatively related to
increasing pollution levels. Otherwise, financial
performance appears to be largely immune or
indifferent to greenhouse gas emission levels,
when the reported standard errors are robust to
some kinds of misspecification.
For the same models as above (see Table 8),
we fitted the cross-sectional time-series regression
models when the disturbance term is first-order
autoregressive [4], which is appropriate since
the random-effects model can accommodate
covariates that are constant over time. Again,
return on equity (ROE) is positively related to
pollution intensity, while operating efficiency and
investment turnover are negatively correlated
to levels of greenhouse gas emissions. These
specifications are better than the heterosce-
dasticity robust models in terms of overall
predictive ability; we notice a 5% increase in
overall R2 for models using the size proxies
alternatively. The autoregressive models are
able to capture more of the variation between
the entities, and less of the particularities of each
period within the performance of individual
companies. 
Limitations and Conclusions
In the following paragraphs we survey the
limitations of our study. The panel data is spanning
a period between 2004 and 2007; hence, this
rendered a possible time series analysis
irrelevant. Moreover, period fixed effects specific
to an event study were also disregarded due to
the impossibility to clearly define the
particularities of emission levels of one year
over another. In this sense, there appears to be
no systematic patterns over our period of
interest in the quantities of carbon equivalent
emissions. As a clear-cut limitation of our study,
we should mention the lack of more developed
dynamic models; this difficulty would be easily
surpassed in a few years’ time, when more
comprehensive data is to accumulate.
The companies included in the sample are
representative of their industries, but also of
their country of origin; they are large contributors
to national GDP, as well as important tax
payers and employers. However, country
differences are likely to become unobservable
in this type of study, and for this sample of 77
entities it does not appear possible to trace the
company’s environmental performance to the
incorporation country’s governmental involvement
in eco-sustainability. 
There is always the question of data
reliability: these multinational groups operate
on five continents. We do not have one
hundred percent certainty that the collection
methods are consistent across production
sites, that the final amounts fairly present
a consolidated view of the polluter’s profile, or
that the assurance statements are written in
good faith. Since all the information is self-
reported, the credibility of our empirical
research goes as far as the quality of the data
extracted from corporate reports. 
The main limitation of the present study is
the inclusion of only the greenhouse gas
emissions as the indicator of environmental
performance. Economic impacts on the natural
environment cannot be limited to carbon
dioxide emissions, which are only a part of the
total share of responsibility companies have
towards protecting the earth. One could argue
that waste management, toxic releases, noise
and odor, water withdrawal and discharges, as
well as the complex impact on biodiversity should
also be used as environmental performance
indicators. The present paper has presented
empirical evidence on greenhouse gas emissions
and their relationship to financial performance
mainly due to the availability of panel data for
this indicator. Even so, the sample could suffer
of selection bias, because only companies with
data for four consecutive years were included
in the econometric analysis. Nevertheless,
future studies should also analyze relevant
data from other areas of environmental impact,
such as effluents, waste, water, energy,
materials, biodiversity or eco-efficiency.
To briefly summarize our contribution, it is
necessary to highlight the relevance of this new
dataset, containing aggregated greenhouse gas
emission figures, as well as IFRS-compliant
financial performance indicators, in a complex
panel design focused on EU enterprises. We
conducted several types of analyses, tailored to
capture the sign and strength of the relationship
between environmental and financial performance.
We also introduced an innovative measure of
responsible governance, as an interaction term
between board-level innovations and the level
of independent assurance. Our results are mixed,
largely dependent on different model specifications
and the several procedures to obtain robust
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standard errors. As expected, there is no definitive
conclusion on the aforementioned relationship.
Responsible governance seems to have an
insignificant contribution to real sustainability
performance, as well as to the economic welfare
of the firm. Overall, we support McWilliams &
Siegel’s [22] contention that CSR attributes –
here including emission reduction efforts – will
have higher costs, but also higher revenues,
resulting in a neutral relationship between CSR
activity and firm financial performance.
This work was cofinanced from the
European Social Fund through the Sectoral
Operational Programme Human Resources
Development 2007–2013, project number
POSDRU/1.5/S/59184, “Performance and
excellence in postdoctoral research in
Romanian economics science domain”.
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Abstract
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE AND RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: AN EMPIRICAL NOTE
Voicu D. Dragomir
Does it pay to be green? This question is by no means new or surprising; but what is really puzzling
is that dedicated research efforts have failed to provide consistent evidence on this issue.
Therefore, the ‘business case’ for sustainability is controversial, despite the fact that companies are
more and more under pressure to standardize and expand their voluntary ethical practices. The
research design serves the purpose of answering some of these questions: 77 large industrial
European companies were included in a highly-relevant new dataset, containing aggregated
greenhouse gas emission figures, as well as universally-accepted financial performance indicators.
On these balanced panel data we conducted several types of analyses, tailored to capture the sign
and strength of the relationship between environmental and financial performance. We also
introduced an innovative measure of responsible governance, as an interaction term between
board-level innovations and the level of independent assurance. Our results are mixed, largely
dependent on different model specifications and the several procedures to obtain robust standard
errors. As expected, there is no definitive conclusion on the aforementioned relationship.
Responsible governance seems to have an insignificant contribution to real sustainability
performance, as well as to the economic welfare of the firm. Overall, we support the results to be
found in the prior literature, in that CSR attributes – here including emission reduction efforts – will
bear higher costs, but also higher revenues, resulting in a neutral relationship between CSR activity
and firm financial performance. Owing to the uniqueness of the database in use and to the
complexity of the econometric analysis, our findings are another proof of the controversy
surrounding the relationship between firm financial and environmental performance.
Key Words: Greenhouse gas emissions, European Union, financial performance,
sustainability, environmental performance, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility.
JEL Classification: G3, L25, M4, Q5.
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